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LONGSHOREMAN-SHIPOWNER-STEVEDORE: 
THE CIRCLE OF LIABILITY 
Harney B. Stover, Jr.* 
J. INTRODUCTION 
IT is universally recognized that in the past two decades the United States Supreme Court has substantially revised the law 
under which seamen, longshoremen and harbor workers (or their 
survivors) may recover damages for personal injury and death. 
One of the more recent and most authoritative texts in the field 
of admiralty and maritime law devotes an entire chapter, 147 
pages in length, to the subject of the rights of seamen and mari-
time workers (or their survivors) of recovery for injury and death.1 
The introduction to that chapter likens the Court's rewriting of 
the law in this field to a volcano and states that as long as it "con-
tinues in eruption, no charts can be guaranteed reliable" as to its 
future course. It must be conceded that one of the more recent, 
major and most astounding eruptions is that pertaining to the 
rights of longshoremen to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained in the course of their employment aboard vessels. Since 
World War II the spotlight of judicial decision and review in 
maritime cases has been focused upon this one narrow field until 
it has become one of the most litigious in this country. It is the 
purpose of this article to review the background and history of 
events within that field, set forth clearly and concisely the status 
of the law and note some changes which may be forthcoming. 
At the outset it would probably be helpful to define some of 
the terms that will be used in the course of this article. The term 
"seamen" will be used in the broad sense of those who qualify in 
case of injury for maintenance and cure, that is, for receipt of a 
daily living allowance and medical expenses from the ship or her 
owner until a maximum cure has been effected.2 Generally the 
three basic requirements for one to qualify as a seaman in order 
to be entitled to maintenance and cure in case of injury are that 
the vessel be in navigation, that the person have some permanent 
connection with the vessel, and that the person be employed 
• Member of the Michigan and Wisconsin Bars.-Ed. 
1 GILMORE &: BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY ch. VI, at 248-394 (1957). 
2 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). 
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aboard the vessel primarily to aid in navigation. 3 These require-
ments are very liberally construed. The "shipowner" is the person, 
group of persons, firm or corporate entity in whom is vested the 
title to the ship.4 The terms "longshoremen" and "stevedore" 
will be used in the generic sense. The "longshoremen" are the 
laborers who do the actual physical work. The "stevedore" is the 
contractor or boss who employs longshoremen.5 
IL SEAMEN'S REMEDY FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS 
It has been firmly established for many years that it is the duty 
of the shipowner to furnish seamen with a "seaworthy" ship. In 
I 789 the United States District Court for the District of Pennsyl-
vania, in a rather obscure decision, held that a seaman had the 
right to leave his ship without any penalty, such as forfeiture of 
wages or prosecution for desertion, if the shipowner failed to pro-
vide him with a seaworthy vessel.6 In 1903 in The Osceola,7 long 
considered to be one of the landmark cases in the admiralty and 
maritime law field, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. 
Justice Brown, summed up existing case law and stated the propo-
sition that "the vessel and her owner are, both by English and 
American Law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by 
seamen in the consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, 
or a failure to supply and keep in order appliances appurtenant 
to the ship."8 As is apparent from the extended discussion in that 
decision, the unseaworthiness remedy was a departure from most 
of the various continental codes which limited an injured sea-
man's recovery in any case to maintenance and cure, perhaps fol-
lowing the lead of the English Merchants' Shipping Act of 1876 
which permitted that type of recovery. The injured seaman, like 
any other injured person, was barred from recovery at common 
law for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. That 
this was equally true under the maritime law had been assumed 
by the courts, because of the absence of authority otherwise,9 and 
3 Senko v. La Cross Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Norton v. Warner Co., 
321 U.S. 565 (1944); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); 
Nelson v. Greene Line· Steamers, Inc., 255 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1958); A. L. Mechling 
Barge Line v. Bassett, 119 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1941); Hawn v. American S.S. Co., 107 
F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1939). 
4 DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY 724 (2d ed. 1948). 
5 See id. at 472. 
6 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789). 
'l 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
s Id. at 175. 
9 The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). 
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was finalized as another of the propositions in Mr. Justice Brown's 
opinion. The development of the unseaworthiness remedy was 
referred to by Mr. Justice Brown as a "wholesome doctrine." This 
was probably because it gave seamen, who had been traditionally 
protected by the courts and frequently referred to as "wards of 
the admiralty," a remedy for injuries other than the relatively 
meager recovery of maintenance and cure. Also, this case was 
decided early in the period which finally produced legislative 
abrogation of the fellow servant rule-as to railway employees in 
1908 with the adoption of the Federal Railway Employees Liabil-
ity Act, 10 as to seamen in 1920 with the adoption of the Jones Act,11 
and as to many other workers with the adoption of state work-
men's compensation acts. 
III. LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WoRKERS COMPENSATION AcT 
After 1903, and for the next forty-three years, the shipowner's 
warranty of seaworthiness was limited to seamen. Because it was 
not thought to be applicable to longshoremen and because the 
common-law fellow servant doctrine made recovery of damages 
by longshoremen from their stevedore-employers quite difficult 
(most longshoremen's injuries being caused in whole or in part 
by the negligence of co-workers), longshoremen were in most in-
stances without an effective remedy to recover much of anything 
for in juries received in the course of their employment. In 1917, 
shortly after upholding the constitutionality of state workmen's 
compensation acts in general,12 the United States Supreme Court 
held the New York act to be unconstitutional as to a longshore-
man because he was injured aboard a vessel on navigable waters 
while performing maritime work under a maritime contract and 
so came within the admiralty jurisdiction.13 The Court held that 
application of the state compensation act would be inimical to 
national uniformity in the maritime law, that the power to modify 
maritime law rested in Congress, that only common-law remedies, 
and not statutory compensation provisions, were covered by the 
"saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and that 
a state compensation remedy was inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent to encourage investment in shipping evidenced by 
10 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958). 
11 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). 
12 New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 
U.S. 210 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). 
13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
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the limitation of liability acts of 1851. Later that same year Con-
gress amended the "saving to suitors" clause to include the rights 
and remedies of claimants under state workmen's compensation 
laws. In 1920 that amendment was held to be unconstitutional as 
an invalid delegation of federal power to the states.14 Four years 
later a second similar statutory amendment was also held to be 
unconstitutional.15 Because of the failure of effective legislative 
action, late in 1926 the Supreme Court held that longshoremen 
were "seamen" under the provisions of the Jones Act, giving them 
an effective remedy for negligence against their stevedore-em-
ployers.16 Six months later Congress adopted the Longshoremen 
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act17 as an exclusive remedy 
for longshoremen against their stevedore-employers, nullifying the 
decision bringing longshoremen under the Jones Act. The con-
stitutionality of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1932.18 The 
purpose in adopting that statute was undoubtedly the same as 
that for the adoption of most workmen's compensation acts-to 
provide employees with a remedy which is both expeditious and 
independent of proof of fault and to assure employers of a liability 
which is limited and determinate.19 
The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act 
provides for compensation payments for disability or death re-
sulting from injuries arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment,20 provided that the death or disability results from an injury 
occurring on the navigable waters of the United States, including 
any dry dock, and that recovery may not validly be provided by 
state law.21 A person injured while working on an uncompleted 
vessel, then launched and afloat in navigable waters, but still 
under construction, is covered by the act, and acceptance of com-
pensation payments in such a case under a state compensation act 
does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law so as 
to preclude recovery under the federal act, the payments under 
the state act being credited to those due under the federal provi-
14 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
15 Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). 
16 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). 
11 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958). 
18 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
19 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932). 
20 64 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1958). 
21 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958). 
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sions.22 Absolute liability of the employer irrespective of fault is 
provided for,23 and recovery schedules for various degrees of dis-
ability24 and for death25 prescribe amounts of awards based upon 
the worker's wage rate.26 Compensation is not payable under the 
act to the master or members of the crew of any vessel, to any 
persons engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any 
vessel under eighteen tons net, to an officer or employee of the 
United States Government or any agency thereof or any state or 
foreign government or any political subdivision thereof, or to 
any person injured or killed solely by reason of his intoxication 
or his willful intent to injure or kill himself or another.27 As to 
the last restriction, there is a presumption against the presence of 
intoxication or willful intent to injure or kill in the absence of 
convincing evidence to the contrary,28 and horseplay has been 
held not to bar recovery under the act.29 Although the injured 
worker's remedy under the act is exclusive as against his stevedore-
employer, the employer who has not complied with the act's re-
quirements for securing payments may be subjected to an action 
for damages, either at law or in admiralty, and in such action the 
defenses of fellow servant, contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk are abolished.30 Penalties are also established for failure 
on the part of both employer31 and employees,32 as well as ship-
mrners,33 to comply with provisions of the act. 
JV. UNSEAWORTHINESS REMEDY EXTENDED TO LONGSHOREMEN 
For a period of nineteen years following the passage of the 
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, the 
courts were content for longshoremen to live exclusively within 
its terms in the case of injuries received or death incurred aboard 
a ship. Then in 1946 the Supreme Court for the first time held 
22 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962). 
23 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1958). 
2t 44 Stat. 1427 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1958). 
25 44 Stat. 1429 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1958). 
26 44 Stat. 1431 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 910 (1958). 
21 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958). 
2s 44 Stat. 1436 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 920 (1958). 
20 General Acc. Fire&: Life Assur. Corp. v. Crowell, 76 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1935). 
30 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958). 
31 44 Stat. 1442 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 938 (1958) (for failure to secure payments). 
32 44 Stat. 1439 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 931 (1958) (for misrepresentations for purpose of 
obtaining benefits under tbe act). 
33 44 Stat. 1442 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 937 (1958) (for failure to demand certificate of 
compliance from stevedore). 
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that a longshoreman could bring suit against a shipowner, whether 
or not the shipowner was negligent, for damages incurred by rea-
son of the unseaworthiness of the vessel aboard which he was 
injured, in addition to receiving compensation from his stevedore-
employer under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Com-
pensation Act.34 The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness was 
extended to longshoremen working aboard the vessel on the basis 
that, since they were then doing work which was traditionally 
done by seamen, they should receive the same benefits as did 
seamen. As could be expected, that decision proved to be the gate-
way to a new field of litigation in the maritime law. In 1953 the 
doctrine was extended to other types of harbor workers, such as 
the carpenter-employee of a repairman.35 At the same time the 
Supreme Court also recognized that longshoremen and harbor 
workers have the right of business invitees aboard a ship to recover 
damages for operating negligence, in addition to their newly-
found right of recovery for injuries resulting from the unsea-
worthiness of the ship.36 Thus the longshoreman was placed on 
a par with the seaman, having a right to recover damages from the 
shipowner for negligence, similar to that which the seaman en-
joyed under the Jones Act, as well as the seaman's ancient mari-
time remedy to recovery damages for the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel. In addition the longshoreman also retained an absolute 
right to compensation from his stevedore-employer under the 
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. Though 
there was originally a hint otherwise, it is now apparently clear 
that the seaworthiness warranty does not extend to the longshore-
man's stevedore-employer.37 
V. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF UNSEAWORTHINESS 
The seaman's right to a seaworthy vessel having been accorded 
to longshoremen, an examination of the meaning of the term 
"unseaworthiness" seems necessary. Over the years this concept 
has become almost all-inclusive. It has come to mean much more 
34 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). 
35 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). It has been held that the 
seaworthiness warranty does not extend to a longshoreman working on the dock at a 
job not traditionally done by seamen. Partenweederei, MS Belgrano v. Weigel, 299 F.2d 
897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962). 
36 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra note 35, at 413, 415. 
37 Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), 
aff'd, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960). 
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than simply a ship's being holed so as to cause her to sink, and 
includes within its scope structural defects and defective machin-
ery, appliances, furnishings, tackle and equipment. Unseaworthi-
ness claims have been said to fall into two categories: one, where 
the shipowner, having knowledge, actual or constructive, that 
certain activity will occur, has the absolute duty of furnishing 
equipment and a place aboard ship for its use so that the activity 
can be conducted and accomplished in reasonable safety; the other, 
where the equipment actually supplied for doing the work proves 
incapable of performing its function in the manner for which it 
was designed.38 It is now firmly established that a vessel's unsea-
worthiness may arise from any number of individual circum-
stances, including among others: defective gear, appurtenances 
in disrepair, unfit crew, improper manner of loading cargo and 
improper stowage of cargo.39 It must be made quite clear, how-
ever, that mere negligent use of seaworthy equipment does not, 
in and of itself, make a vessel unseaworthy.4° Control of the work 
area is irrelevant to liability for unseaworthiness.41 A ship is un-
seaworthy even if the defective equipment is brought aboard the 
ship by a stevedore for its own use,42 but there is growing authority 
that such may not be the case where the defective equipment is 
that of the stevedore and does not become an "integral part of the 
ship."43 Whether or not equipment is so defective as to render 
a ship unseaworthy is a question of fact for the jury.44 Inter-
pretation of the term has sometimes been carried to extreme 
lengths, and such is no more apparent than in a recent decision 
of the Supreme Court where it was held to be a jury question 
whether a wrench, concerning which there was testimony from 
which it might be inferred that there was play in its jaw so as to 
permit it to slip on a nut, was such a defective appliance as to 
38 Meslc v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 
(1959). An excellent and exhaustive discussion of the term "unseaworthiness" is also 
presented by Judge Herlands in Di Salvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959). 
so Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962). 
40 Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 
(1960); Seitz v. M.V. Captantonis, 203 F. Supp. 723 (D. Ore. 1962). 
41 Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). 
42 Ibid. Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); Considine v. Black Dia-
mond S.S. Co., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958). 
43 Sherbin v. Embiricos, 200 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1962); McKnight v. N. M. Pat-
erson &: Sons, Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio), afj'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960). 
44 Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Knox v. United States 
Lines Co., 294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961). 
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render a ship unseaworthy.45 A ship is not regarded as unseaworthy 
because of a latent defect in its cargo,46 but the desirability of this 
attitude is surely to be questioned in the future. 
A shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute, 
continuing and non-delegable, and the shipowner is not absolved 
from this obligation by the exercise of due diligence.47 Notice to 
the master or shipowner and actual or constructive knowledge 
of the unseaworthy condition are no longer necessary, so that lia-
bility attaches for transitory or temporary unseaworthiness, in-
volving situations such as water, soap, food, oil, grease, slime, 
etc., on the deck, as well as for a permanent condition.48 It has 
been authoritatively stated that the shipowner's duty is not to 
provide an "accident-free ship," but is a duty "only to furnish a 
vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use"; 411 
that "the standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a 
ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every 
imaginable peril of the sea, but of a vessel reasonably suitable for 
her intended service."50 The meaning of this phraseology, ostensi-
bly introducing some concept of reasonableness into the shipown-
er's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, will undoubtedly 
be the subject of much litigation for many years. 
The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness does not attach to 
a "dead ship" not in navigation, such as a grain storage vessel.151 
In the case of a bareboat or demise charter, the charterer or 
demisee stands in the place of the shipowner, and the shipowner 
is not liable for unseaworthiness of the vessel caused by the 
45 Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., supra note 44. 
46 Bell v. Nihonkai Kisen, K.K., 204 F. Supp. 230 (D. Ore. 1962). 
47 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Michalic v. Cleveland Tank• 
ers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). 
48 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra note 47. 
49 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955). (Emphasis added.) 
50 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). (Emphasis added.) This 
case involved an injury to a crew member aboard a fishing vessel who slipped, fell and 
was injured when, in accordance with recognized custom, he stepped onto the ship's 
rail in order to reach a ladder attached to the pier to go ashore. The rail had become 
slippery from spawn and slime which had accumulated there during the unloading of 
the vessel's catch of fish and fish spawn. The jury had found against the injured sea• 
man on the question of unseaworthiness, but the district judge had instructed the jury 
that constructive notice was necessary in order to support liability for unseaworthiness. 
The Supreme Court held such to be unnecessary, and reversed and remanded for a 
new trial on the issue of unseaworthiness. In doing so, the Court acknowledged the 
absoluteness of the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, but also made the 
somewhat ambignous and contrary statement quoted above. 
51 Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20 (1961). 
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charterer or demisee.52 A split of authority exists as to wheth~r 
the vessel herself is liable therefor and can be made a party to 
an action along with the charterer or demisee. 53 
Negligent use of an otherwise seaworthy appliance, which is 
thereby made "unseaworthy" at the very moment of injury, raises 
no unseaworthiness question, and the shipowner is not liable 
therefor.54 Though this is a relatively simple proposition, its 
interpretation is most difficult and can best be explained by illus-
tration. In one case a situation was considered in which a loading 
board tipped and spilled rolls of paper into the hold of a vessel, 
injuring a longshoreman. Fellow longshoremen had loaded the 
board improperly. The court held that a stevedore's negligent use 
of proper equipment for bringing freight aboard did not make the 
vessel unseaworthy. It was specifically stated that the court did 
"not believe that unseaworthiness is to be equated with mere 
negligent conduct."55 Another situation involved a longshoreman 
who was injured when a winch, operated by a fellow longshore-
man who failed to insert a locking pin, fell out of gear and be-
came free-wheeling, causing a hatch section which had been raised 
to drop and strike him on the foot. In that instance the court held 
that the longshoreman's injury was incurred through the negligent 
use of a seaworthy appliance at the very moment of injury, so that 
the vessel, upon the termination of the negligence, was in fact sea-
worthy, and the injured longshoreman had no right of recovery 
against the shipowner.56 Recent decisions have wrestled with this 
theory in the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court 
upholding the attachment of liability in cases of transitory or 
temporary unseaworthiness, whether or not there was actual or 
constructive notice of the unseaworthy condition. In appropriate 
instances the courts have absolved the shipowner of the charge of 
unseaworthiness, affirming a jury verdict or decision of the trial 
52 Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 302 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1962); Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 
919 (2d Cir. 1956). 
53 Accord, Grillea v. United States, supra note 52. Contra, Reed v. S.S. Yaka, supra 
note 52; Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 698 (1962), 
on the ground that the charter was not a demise. 
54 This was established by Judge Learned Hand in Grillea v. United States, 232 
F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956), but its validity seemed somewhat questionable for awhile be-
cause of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), which did away with 
the defense of transitory unseaworthiness. 
!iii Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 
(1960). 
56 Billed v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Sullivan v. United 
States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
548 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
court holding the ship to have been seaworthy and the accident 
to have resulted directly and solely from the negligence of the 
stevedore through the actions of fellow longshoremen.117 
VI. INDEMNIFICATION OF SHIPOWNER BY STEVEDORE 
A. History 
For a time following the initial decision which extended the 
shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen, it became 
apparent that the longshoreman who received an injury in the 
course of his employment aboard a ship on navigable waters was 
in an enviable position, if an injured man can be so regarded. 
Without the burden of any proof of negligence, he could recover 
compensation under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers 
Compensation Act from his stevedore-employer. At the same time 
he was entitled to recover damages for either negligence or unsea-
worthiness from the shipowner and, in the light of the broad 
judicial interpretation of the meaning of the term "unseaworthi-
ness," the injured longshoreman's recovery of damages in addition 
to compensation was virtually assured. On the other hand, the 
shipowner's position was quite unenviable. His was an almost in-
tolerable burden, and this became no more apparent than in 1952 
in a case in which a jury had found a shipowner to be twenty-five 
percent responsible and a stevedore-employer to be seventy-five 
percent responsible for a longshoreman's injuries, and the Su-
preme Court denied the shipowner indemnification from the 
stevedore because of the ancient prohibition against contribution 
between joint tortfeasors, stating that any change in the common-
law rule was a matter of legislative concern.58 Two years later the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that decision.59 In effect this meant 
that an injured longshoreman or harbor worker could recover 
damages from a shipowner for unseaworthiness, and the shipowner 
57 Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 840 (1962); Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962); Neal v. 
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 306 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1962); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 
F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); Knox 
v. United States Lines Co., 201 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
58 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). The 
district court had ignored the jury verdict and entered judgment to the effect that 
each joint tortfeasor was to pay one-half of the damages. The court of appeals had 
then upheld the shipowner's right of contribution from the stevedore-employer, but 
stated that it could not exceed that which the injured longshoreman might have re• 
covered from his employer directly under the Longshoremen and Harbor ·workers Com-
pensation Act. 
59 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
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had no right to indemnification from the stevedore-employer of 
the injured man, even though the unseaworthiness resulting in the 
recovery was caused solely by the negligence of the stevedore-
employer. The ultimate burden then rested with the shipowner, 
even when not in fact negligent or responsible in any respect, or 
when less responsible than the stevedore, probably on the basis 
that the shipowner could more practicably absorb such a prospec-
tive financial burden than could the stevedore who was already 
subject to an absolute statutory liability under the Longshoremen 
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (and therefore should 
be entitled to limit the amount of his liability). This result ob-
viously worked an injustice upon shipowners, and lower courts 
immediately set about by-passing the ancient common-law rule 
against contribution between joint tortfeasors which the Supreme 
Court had so vigorously applied to maritime torts.60 
B. Stevedore's Warranty of Workmanlike Service 
I. Generally 
The final breakthrough came in 1956 when the Supreme Court 
considered "two questions as to the liability of a stevedoring con-
tractor to reimburse a shipowner for damages paid by the latter 
to one of the contractor's longshoremen on account of injuries 
received by him in the course of his employment on shipboard": 
first, whether the shipowner was precluded from asserting such 
liability by the terms of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers 
Compensation Act and, second, whether such liability existed in 
the absence of an express indemnification agreement between the 
stevedore-employer and the shipowner.61 The first question was 
answered in the negative, and the second in the affirmative. The 
Supreme Court stated that a stevedoring contract contains an im-
plied "warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a 
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured 
product," and held that a stevedore-contractor has the implied 
contractual obligation to the shipowner to perform the stevedor-
ing operation in a proper, competent and workmanlike manner 
with reasonable safety and to discharge foreseeable damages re-
sulting to the shipowner from the stevedore's improper perform-
60 See Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954); Brown v. 
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1954); Crawford v. Pope &: Talbot, 
Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953). 
61 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). 
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ance. With this contractual fiction, the Court succeeded in getting 
around the ever-present bar of the rule against contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors and thus effectively shifted the burden 
from the innocent shipowner to the negligent stevedore-employer 
whose liability had supposedly been limited by virtue of the 
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. 
2. Scope 
The initial decision of the Supreme Court specifically referred 
to the proper and safe stowage of cargo.62 Since then the stevedore's 
warranty of workmanlike service has been expanded and extended 
almost without limit. It has been held that the stevedore also war-
rants to the shipowner that the longshoremen furnished for the job 
are "reasonably fit to perform their functions."63 The stevedore's 
duty to the shipowner is contractual and may be based upon 
principles other than the shipo-wner's failure to perform the non-
delegable duty to a longshoreman to provide him with a seaworthy 
vessel.64 The stevedore's contractual obligation to perform in a 
competent and workmanlike manner relates not only to the han-
dling and stowage of cargo, but also to the use of equipment inci-
dental thereto.65 Theories of "active" or "passive" and "primary" 
or "secondary" negligence do not apply to the field of contractual 
indemnity, and the shipowner-indemnitee may recover, although 
negligent in some respects, provided the shipowner is free from 
"conduct sufficient to preclude recovery."60 Where negligence of 
the stevedore, through its employees, causes unseaworthiness of 
the vessel and results in injury to one of its longshoremen-employ-
ees, such also amounts to a breach of the contractual warranty of 
workmanlike service, and the shipowner is entitled to indemnifica-
tion from the stevedore. 67 It is not necessary that there be a direct 
62 Ibid. 
63 Trenkle v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 179 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1960). 
64 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). However, 
in DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962), the Second Circuit 
stated that a stevedore's obligation to indemnify the shipowner in Iongshoremen's per• 
sonal injury actions is not literally an action ex contractu, and that "the primary 
source of the shipowner's right to indemnity, as a practical matter, is his nondelegable 
duty to provide a seaworthy ship ... .'' Id. at 425. 
65 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., supra note 64. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959). This case involved 
a longshoreman who was injured aboard a vessel when a topping lift broke due to 
abnormal strains placed on the ship's gear and a winch circuit breaker improperly 
set at six tons, when the winch could safely lift only three tons. Both the placement 
of the abnormal strains and the improper setting of the winch circuit breaker were 
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contractual relationship between the shipowner and the stevedore 
for the application of the warranty of work.manlike service, and it 
applies even though the stevedoring contract has been entered 
into with the stevedore by the ship's charterer68 or even by the 
cargo's consignee.611 In effect, if the stevedoring contract is entered 
into by someone other than the shipowner, the shipowner is con-
sidered a third-party beneficiary thereof. 
3. Necessity for Causal Connection 
It is noteworthy, however, that if the stevedore did not create 
the unseaworthy condition which causes the injury to the long-
shoreman, had nothing to do with bringing it into play, and had 
no notice of it, there is authority that the stevedore should not be 
liable for indemnification to the shipowner. In one case, where a 
longshoreman was injured when he slipped on a greasy rung of 
a ladder descending from the deckhouse roof, the longshoreman re-
covered from the shipowner because of the transitory unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel; but the shipowner was denied indemnification 
from the stevedore on the grounds that the stevedore had no notice 
of the greasy condition and no proof was introduced at the trial 
connecting the placing of the grease to the negligence of the 
stevedore's employees.70 In another case a longshoreman was in-
jured when some hatch boards piled on loose dunnage slipped out 
from under him. The vessel was held to be unseaworthy and her 
owner negligent, because the dunnage and hatch boards were piled 
in an unsafe, insecure and haphazard manner; but indemnification 
of the shipowner by the longshoreman's stevedore-employer was 
denied, even though the stevedore had knowledge of the condition, 
because the stevedore had not created the unseaworthy condition 
and it was present in an area over which the stevedore did not 
exercise exclusive control.71 In effect, what has been held in these 
made by longshoremen-employees of the stevedore. The district court entered judgment 
against the shipowner with indemnity over against the stevedore. This judgment was 
reversed by the court of appeals on the ground that the circuit breaker was not un-
seaworthy and that the sole cause of the injury was the negligence of the stevedore. 
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the judgment 
of the district court. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan &: McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960). See also 
Cooper v. D/S A/S Progress, 188 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1960), where an intenllediate 
time charter intervening between charterer and stevedore was held not to affect the 
stevedore's contractual obligation to unload in a safe and workmanlike manner. 
70 Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Massaro v. 
United States Lines Co., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 2168 (3d Cir. 1962). 
71 Marshall v. S.S. Lake Allin, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 2024 (D. Ore. 1960). See also 
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cases is that, even though the stevedore's breach of its warranty 
of workmanlike service is contractual in nature, there must be 
some causal connection between it and the accident resulting in 
the longshoreman's injuries. There is authority, however, indicat-
ing that the stevedore should suspend operations on its own initia-
tive to avoid injury or damages upon realizing that it would be 
unsafe to proceed.72 If the shipowner settles the longshoreman's 
claim for damages due to unseaworthiness independently and then 
seeks indemnity from the stevedore-employer for breach of the 
warranty of workmanlike service, there is authority indicating that 
the shipowner need not establish actual liability to the longshore-
man but only potential liability and the making of a reasonable 
settlement.73 However, such an approach has been subjected to 
criticism.74 
C. Acts of Shipowner Which Do Not Preclude Indemnification 
Barring the situation which clearly involves the negligent 
use of otherwise seaworthy equipment by employees of the steve-
dore, in almost every situation involving a longshoreman who is 
seeking to recover damages from a shipowner for injuries received 
because of the shipowner's negligence or the unseaworthiness of 
his vessel and a shipowner who is in turn seeking indemnification 
from the stevedore-employer of the injured longshoreman, the 
primary question becomes that of what acts on the part of the 
shipowner-indemnitee will preclude recovery from the stevedore-
indemnitor. Of course, this presupposes some breach on the part 
of the stevedore-employer of its warranty of workmanlike service. 
As a general rule, negligent acts on the part of the shipowner-
indemnitee, usually through the instrumentality of the ship's 
crew, have been held not to preclude recovery from the stevedore-
Trenkle v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 179 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1960), 
holding that there must be some act or omission on the part of the stevedore. To 
the same effect, but by very brief reference, is Mesle v. Kea S.S. Co., 260 F.2d 747 (3d 
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959). 
72 United States v. Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 
U.S. 904 (1949); Cassone v. Venezuelan Line, 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); 
Nordeutsher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore. 
1961); Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), 
afj'd, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960). 
73 Rederi A/B Dalen v. Maher, 303 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1962); California Stevedore 
&: Ballast Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 291 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1961); Caswell v. K.N.S.M., 
N.V., 205 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Te."<. 1962). 
74 American Export Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic &: Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 316 
(E.D. Va. 1962). 
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indemnitor. Failure to inspect, and to discover and correct a steve-
dore's breach of warranty of workmanlike service is not a bar to re-
covery from the stevedore by the shipowner. Thus failure to in-
spect, discover and correct improper stowage of cargo aboard the 
vessel,715 and failure to discover and correct the improper use of 
equipment incidental to the handling and stowage of cargo have 
been held not to be conduct sufficient to preclude the shipowner's 
right to recover over against the stevedore.76 A shipowner's supply-
ing of defective equipment to a stevedore is generally held not to 
be such an act as to preclude indemnification. The supplying of a 
defective winch or a winch with a defective component part has 
been held not to preclude indemnification.77 A shipowner's main-
taining inadequate lighting in a hold78 or providing unsafe light-
ing, as in the case of an unseized light,79 do not bar recovery. 
Defective topping lift gear,80 an unbolted ladder,81 use of slippery 
dunnage as flooring82 and unsecured hatch boards, 83 though pro-
vided by the shipowner, are not such as to prevent indemnifica-
tion. Oil on the deck of a ship from a leaking winch box, though 
held to have made the vessel unseaworthy, was not such as to pre-
clude recovery over by the shipowner from the stevedore-employer 
of a longshoreman who slipped and fell on the oily slick.84 Im-
proper securing of a ship for loading or unloading by the ship's 
crew has been held not to preclude indemnification.85 A shipown-
er's providing a litter-strewn area in which longshoremen are to 
work does not bar indemnification, the duty being upon the steve-
dore to clear the work area before commencing to load or dis-
charge cargo. 86 
715 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). 
76 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). 
77 Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); American Export 
Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959); Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 398 
(E.D.N.Y. 1961). 
78 Schiavone Terminal, Inc. v. Bozzo, 289 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1961). 
79 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1959). 
so Cook v. The M/V Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960); Weigel v. The M/V 
Belgrano, 188 F. Supp. 605 (D. Ore. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 897, afj'd 
on rehearing, 302 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962). 
81 Smith v. Jugoslavenska, 278 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1960). 
82 Wyborski v. Bristol City Line of S. Ss., Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1961). 
83 Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal.), afj'd, 
274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960). 
84 Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Santomarco v. United 
States, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 1808 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), afj'd, 277 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 823 (1960). 
85 Lamazza v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
86 DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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One of the most publicized and closely followed cases in this 
particular phase of maritime law development resulted in the 
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Atlantic & Gulf Steve-
dores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.81 Leighton Beard was a long-
shoreman employed by Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. at 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Atlantic performed stevedoring serv-
ices for the owners of the steamship "City of Calcutta," which con-
sisted of discharging bales of burlap from the steamer. Beard was 
one of the longshoremen engaged in helping to discharge the 
cargo. The bales had been loaded in India, were banded with one-
inch bands which were part of the cargo, and were stowed in tiers. 
They were discharged from the vessel by use of the bale-hook 
method. By this method a winch was used with a ring to which six 
equal-length ropes were attached with a hook on the end of each 
rope. Two hooks were used on each bale so that three bales were 
raised with each lifting operation. Longshoremen in the hold of 
the vessel, including Beard, would attach the hooks to the bales, 
signal the winch operator to pull the bales from their stow to a 
position under the open hatch, and then the bales would be raised 
vertically, swung out from the ship .ind lowered to the dock. 
During the unloading operation, two bands on one of the bales 
parted, and the bale fell, injuring Beard. Atlantic had no part 
in the loading or stowage of this particular cargo aboard the ship. 
Beard brought a civil action, founded upon diversity of citizen-
ship, against the shipowner, alleging unseaworthiness and negli-
gence. The shipowner joined the stevedore-employer as a third-
party defendant, alleging negligence in discharging the cargo and 
in using a dangerous and improper method to do so, and seeking 
indemnification in the event that the shipowner was held liable 
to Beard. The case was tried to a jury which found, upon special 
interrogatories, that both the unseaworthiness of the vessel and 
the negligence of the shipowner were substantial factors in causing 
Beard's injuries and that there was no failure of contractual obliga-
tion on the part of the stevedore. The district court entered judg-
ment in favor of Beard against the shipowner and in favor of the 
stevedore on the shipowner's indemnification claim. The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, since the warranty of 
workmanlike service extends to the handling of cargo as well as 
to the use of equipment incidental to cargo handling, the steve-
87 369 U.S. 355, rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 882 (1962). 
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dore was liable, as a matter of law, to the shipowner.88 The court 
stated that if it was negligent on the shipowner's part to permit 
Beard to work in an unsafe place, it was equally negligent for the 
stevedore to handle the cargo which it charged created an unsafe 
place to work. Deeming that it was unnecessary "to consider the 
issue of unseaworthiness," the court of appeals affirmed the judg-
ment in favor of Beard against the shipowner on the issue of 
negligence, but reversed the judgment in favor of the stevedore, 
thereby permitting indemnification. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third Cir-
cuit as between the shipowner and the stevedore, and ruled 
against indemnification. However, careful examination of both 
the decision of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit's deci-
sion reveals that the Supreme Court did not hold that knowledge 
of and failure to warn the stevedore in regard to improper 
stowage or an improper unloading method will preclude the ship-
owner's right of indemnification. Instead, the Court neatly side-
stepped that basic and practical question, as to which the steve-
doring industry was earnestly seeking an authoritative decision, 
and decided the case on a different ground. Essentially, the Court 
held that since the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law," the requirements of 
the seventh amendment were applicable to the case at bar, even 
though a stevedoring contract is a maritime contract. The applica-
bility of the seventh amendment was predicated upon the fact that 
the case involved a suit in personam at law with the right of trial 
by jury. The Court held that, although the jury could have found 
the shipowner negligent for one or both of the reasons that the 
use of the bale-hook method in the discharge of the bales was 
negligent and that the injured longshoreman was not afforded 
a safe place to work, it could also have found the shipowner 
liable on a third ground, that the steel bands around the bale 
were defective, "a matter which was covered by the charge to the 
jury on the issue of unseaworthiness, and properly so." The 
Court then went on the say that if such was the jury's view of the 
facts, then the stevedore would not be liable under any warranty 
of workmanlike service; that where there is a view of the facts 
88 Beard v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 289 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1961). 
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of the case which makes the jury's special verdict legally consistent, 
it must be resolved in that manner; and that, therefore, the jury's 
answers to the special interrogatories should be permitted to stand 
and were not properly the subject of re-examination and reversal 
by the court of appeals. 
Two lessons are to be learned from the Atlantic & Gulf 
Stevedores case. First, negligence in the form of knowledge of 
the shipowner and failure by it to warn the stevedore in regard 
to improper stowage of cargo or improper unloading methods 
being used by the stevedore will not preclude the shipowner's 
right of indemnification from the stevedore. The reversal by the 
Supreme Court was not on this ground, and there was authority 
prior to the Third Circuit's decision supporting that proposition.89 
Second, interrogatories for the special verdict of a jury in regard to 
the indemnification issue must be artfully worded so as to result in 
clear revelation of the exact basis of the jury's decision, either in 
favor of or against indemnification. 
D. Acts of Shipowners Which Do Preclude Indemnification 
I. Failure of Shipowner To Correct or Warn 
of Known Latent Defect 
Thus far, the only activity of the shipowner-indemnitee which 
has been authoritatively held to preclude recovery from the ste-
vedore-indemnitor has been the failure of the shipowner to cor-
rect or warn the stevedore of a latent, or hidden, dangerous defect 
or condition known to the shipowner.90 In a situation where a 
longshoreman fell from atop crates on board a lighter to a pier 
below when one of the crate boards broke, it was held that the 
injury was not caused by any improper stowage, but was caused 
by the defective board, and that "the latent defect in the board 
on top of the crate was an intervening cause which broke any causal 
chain that might otherwise have existed," and so precluded in-
89 W. J. Jones &: Sons, Inc. v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 284 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1960), 
affirming 163 F. Supp. 463 (D. Ore. 1959); Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia, 272 F.2d 235 (3d 
Cir. 1959). See also Nordeutscher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 
F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore. 1961); Fisher v. United States Lines Co., 198 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. 
Pa. 1961). 
90 Although such was not actually involved, the Supreme Court made specific ref-
erence to situations involving known latent defects in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema 
Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). In Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506 
(2d Cir. 1962), the Second Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the trial court 
specifically on the ground that the condition for which the ship had been found un-
seaworthy was a patent condition and not a latent defect or contrary to the usual and 
customary standards. 
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demnification.91 Likewise, it has been held that the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike service of the stevedore does not place upon 
him the duty to discover defects in apparatus furnished by the 
vessel not obvious upon a cursory inspection, such as a rotten 
rope92 or a defective rung in a Jacob's ladder.93 As indicated pre-
viously, this rationale has not as yet been judicially extended to 
include a latent defect in the ship's cargo.94 
2. Breach of Express Warranty by Shipowner 
One of the most interesting and more recent decisions in this 
entire field is Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet lnternational.95 
That case involved a situation in which a queen beam belonging in 
the number one main deck hatch of the motorship "Castleville" was 
misplaced under the hatch boards of the forward section of num-
ber one 'tweendeck hatch, so that the 'tweendeck hatch boards 
wobbled, seesawed and were generally insecure. A longshoreman 
fell through the hatch into the hold when walking on the insecure 
hatch boards. Although the shipowner was held liable for damages 
to the injured longshoreman since the vessel was deemed unsea-
worthy because of the misplaced queen beam and unsecured hatch 
boards, it was also held entitled to indemnification from the ste-
vedore-employer since the stevedore was found to have breached 
its contractual obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner 
with reasonable safety by permitting its men to work on the 
known dangerous hatch boards. The decision was affirmed by the 
court of appeals.96 Though the case was actually not decided on 
this point, the district court in its opinion seemed to indicate 
that breach by the shipowner of a written warranty in a steve-
doring contract might relieve the stevedore of its implied obliga-
tion to indemnify the vessel for breach of its warranty of work-
manlike service, if the stevedore was unaware of the breach of 
warranty on the part of the shipowner. But the court went on to 
state that if the stevedore knew of the breach and nonetheless 
willingly proceeded with the work despite the known dangerous 
01 Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958). To 
the same effect in a similar situation, see Pena v. A/S Dovrefjell, 176 F. Supp. 677 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
02 Ignatyuk v. Tramp Chartering Co., 250 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1957). 
OS Sciarrillo v. S.S. Fred Christiansen, 206 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
o~ Sec note 46 supra. 
llll 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
06 Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 274 F.2d 875 
(9th Cir. 1960). 
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condition, such would be a waiver by the stevedore of the ship-
owner's breach of warranty.97 On appeal the Ninth Circuit spe-
cifically indicated that it need not consider the question of waiver, 
but did state that the evidence fully supported the findings of 
waiver, if it were necessary. In a subsequent case, another district 
court in the same circuit so interpreted the reasoning of the trial 
court in the first case, but based its holding on a different grpund 
and specifically stated that it made no decision as to whether a 
breach of written warranty by the shipowner would relieve the 
stevedore.98 In an even later decision in another circuit it was 
held that a written indemnification provision, whereby the steve-
dore agreed to indemnify the shipowner, meant that when both 
the shipowner and stevedore were negligent, the stevedore was to 
indemnify the shipowner.99 From the opposite point of view, then, 
it should follow that if there is a written indemnification provision 
whereby the shipowner agrees to indemnify the stevedore and both 
are negligent, the shipowner should idemnify the stevedore. This 
has not as yet been decided, but there is some authority indicating 
that a stevedore may limit its liability for indemnification by ex-
press stipulation.100 
E. Law Applicable to Indemnification 
An express indemnity clause in a contract between a steve-
dore and a shipowner is governed by federal law,101 and recovery 
under implied warranties is precluded where express contractual 
warranties cover the field.102 However, as a practical matter, where 
there are express contractual warranties present, there is no need 
to employ the fiction of an implied warranty. Because the Supreme 
Court has apparently assumed the federal character of the law to 
be applied to maritime service contracts in its leading decisions, 
97 Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601, 611 (S.D. Cal. 
1959). 
98 Cook v. M/V Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960). 
99 See note 85 supra. 
100 In DeGioia v. United States Lines, 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962), the court made 
this bald statement, but the citation given as the basis therefor was D'Agosta v. Royal 
Netherlands S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1962), which held that recovery under an 
implied warranty is precluded where an express warranty covers the situation. 
It is now clear, however, that a shipowner's material breach of a written stevedoring 
contract will bar the shipowner's right to indemnification from the stevedore under an 
express indemnification provision in the contract. Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., ll05 F.2d 
151 (2d Cir. 1962). 
101 A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 
227 (2d Cir. 1958). 
102 D'Agosta v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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it has been held that the federal maritime law also governs in 
situations involving an implied warranty of workmanlike service 
by the stevedore to the shipowner.103 Even in a state court the 
federal substantive law is applicable, but it has been held that, 
subject to the court's discretion, the state procedural law will be 
applied unless it so influences the parties' substantive rights as 
to require the adoption of the federal practice as well as sub-
stantive law.104 In Pennsylvania this resulted in application of the 
substantive maritime law as to the rights of the injured long-
shoreman and the shipowner, but prevented impleader of the 
stevedore because of a state court principle against determination 
of a contractual right to indemnification in an action for damages 
for personal injury.105 This line of reasoning was subsequently 
rejected and impleader was permitted by one of the federal courts 
in that same jurisdiction.106 Federal maritime law also prohibits 
an action in admiralty against a shipowner by the wife of an in-
jured or deceased longshoreman for loss of consortium.107 
\ 
F. Recovery of Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses 
The great weight of authority provides that the shipowner-
indemnitee may recover attorney fees and expenses of litigation 
from the stevedore-indemnitor under either an express or an 
implied indemnity relationship.108 One case held this to be limited 
to provisions of express indemnification or to the situation in 
103 Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1962): 
Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier 8c Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958). 
lOi Lloyd v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 402 Pa. 484, 167 A.2d 689 (1960). 
1011 Ibid. 
106 Scioli v. Dammers 8c Van Der Heide's Shipping 8c Trading Co., 28 F.R.D. 396 
(E.D. Pa. 1961). Contra, West Afr. Nav., Ltd. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 191 F. Supp. 
131 (E.D. Pa. 1961), decided three months earlier. In Cooper v. D/S A/S Progress, 188 
F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1960), it was held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14 and 
42(a) clearly permit trial together of the principal action and the third party action 
for indemnification. 
101 Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 207 F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Pruitt 
v. M.S. Rigoletto, 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1997 (E.D. Mich. 1962). 
108 Rederi A/B Dalen v. Maher, 303 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1962); DeGioia v. United 
States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. 
Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1958); Shannon v. United States, 
235 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1956); Holley v. Steamship Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805 
(E.D. Va. 1960). The latter decision contains an excellent and extensively annotated 
discussion on the subject of recovery of costs and attorney fees in cases of indemnifi-
cation for breach of warranty. See also Caswell v. K.N.S.M., N.V., 205 F. Supp. 295 
(S.D. Tex. 1962); Serrano v. Fletes Maritimos S.A., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1183 (D.P.R. 
1962); Milea v. International Terminal Operating Co., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961); Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Cooper v. D/S A/S Progress, 
188 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
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which the stevedore, after notice, failed to take the necessary steps 
to avoid the injury.109 The court specifically held against recovery 
of attorney fees by the shipowner from the stevedore where neither 
the shipowner nor the stevedore was liable because of a failure of 
proof, though it was stated that recovery of fees in such a case 
might be permissible if there was an express agreement to that 
effect. Another decision refused such recovery to a shipowner 
where there was a settlement between the injured longshoreman 
and his stevedore-employer, and there was no showing of an ex-
press agreement by the stevedore to pay the shipowner's costs 
and attorney fees nor a willingness on the part of the shipowner 
to turn over the defense of the case to the stevedore.U0 The Second 
Circuit very recently considered a situation wherein the stevedore-
employer settled with the injured longshoreman during the pend-
ency of the trial, and allowed the shipowner-indemnitee to re-
cover its litigation expenses from the stevedore-indemnitor, even 
though the shipowner's pleading sought indemnity for sums that 
might be "adjudged" against it, specifically making its ruling ap-
plicable to either an express or an implied indemnification pro-
vision.111 In order to follow the safest course and protect its interest 
in regard to recovery of attorney fees and litigation expenses, 
it would probably be advisable in indemnification cases for the 
shipowner to tender defense to the stevedore and, whenever pos-
sible, to implead the stevedore in the longshoreman's case against 
the shipowner. The failure to bring in the stevedore when service 
could have been made upon it has been held in one case to pre-
clude subsequent action by the shipowner against the stevedore-
employer for indemnification.112 
G. Indemnification of Stevedore by Longshoreman Prohibited 
In actions involving these matters, some authority holds that 
the stevedore-employer cannot counterclaim or file a cross-com-
plaint or cross-libel against the longshoreman-employee, 113 though 
109 Cimino v. United States, 1960 Am. Mar. Gas. 2120 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also 
DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., supra note 108; Hill v. American President Lines, 
194 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Va. 1961). 
110 Deans v. Kihlstrom, 197 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Va. 1961). 
111 Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1962). 
112 See note 74 supra. 
113 Cavelleri v. Isthmian Lines, 190 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Cook v. 
The M/S Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960). The Cavelleri case was certified 
for appeal but the Second Circuit refused to entertain the appeal. In Malfitano v. 
King Line, Ltd., 198 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), Judge Moore declined to agree with 
the decision of Judge Kaufman in Cavelleri. Since then Judge Feinberg has distin-
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this question has yet to be considered by the Supreme Court. The 
obvious reason for this rule is that, if such were permitted, there 
would then be established a never-ending circle of liability seem-
ingly incapable of final resolution. It must be noted, however, 
that contributory negligence on the part of the injured longshore-
man will reduce his recovery and, consequently, the amount of the 
indemnification from the stevedore to the shipowner, on a com-
parative negligence basis, in accordance with the percentage or 
degree of his fault. 114 
VII. SUMMARY 
Under the present state of the law in this field, which by the 
very nature of its past could be the subject of substantial change 
in the future, it is clear that an injured longshoreman, whose in-
juries are caused either directly or indirectly by the unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel aboard which he is working at the time of his 
injury, has a right to recover damages from the shipowner, re-
duced in proportion to his mm contributory negligence, if any. 
The shipowner in turn may obtain complete indemnification from 
the longshoreman's stevedore-employer, including even costs of 
trial and actual attorney fees, if the unseaworthiness of the vessel 
was caused either in whole or in part or was brought into play 
by the stevedore's breach of its warranty to perform its service in 
a competent and workmanlike manner. In effect such a breach 
would be brought about by the negligence of the stevedore-
employer through its employees. Thus far, the only act on the 
part of a shipowner which has been held to preclude such indem-
nification from the stevedore-employer of the injured longshore-
man is failure on the part of the shipowner to correct or warn the 
stevedore of a latent, or hidden, dangerous defect or condition 
in the vessel or its appliances known to the shipowner. However, 
even in such an instance it is probable that if the latent, dangerous 
defect or condition becomes known to the stevedore and the steve-
dore nevertheless proceeds with its loading or unloading of the 
vessel, this would be held to be a waiver of the shipowner's failure 
to correct or warn, and, in the case of a subsequent injury to a 
guished the two and followed Cavelleri in Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F. 
Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
114 Massaro v. United States Lines Co., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 2168 (3d Cir. 1962); 
Drago v. Inger, 194 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Santomarco v. United States, 1959 
Am. Mar. Cas. 1808 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), afj'd, 277 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 
823 (1960). 
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longshoreman-employee of the stevedore, the shipowner would 
not be precluded from obtaining complete indemnification from 
the stevedore-employer. There is a hint of authority for the propo-
sition that breach of an express warranty in the stevedoring con-
tract by the shipowner will preclude indemnification from the 
stevedore-employer in case of injury to a longshoreman caused 
thereby. This question has been decided only as to an express in-
demnification provision. Again, it is probable that the stevedore's 
proceeding in the face of a known breach of express warranty by 
the shipowner would be held to be a waiver by the stevedore of 
the shipowner's breach. 
VIII. COMMENT 
The brief but fluid history of recovery of damages for injuries 
received by longshoremen in the course of their employment 
aboard vessels on navigable waters has virtually completed its 
circle. At first the injured longshoreman sought recovery of dam-
ages from his stevedore-employer. Because of the fact that most 
longshoremen's injuries were caused by the negligent acts of their 
co-workers and therefore were subject to the common-law fellow 
servant doctrine, thought to be applicable to the maritime law, 
which prohibited recovery in such cases, the injured longshore-
man's remedy against his stevedore-employer proved ineffective. 
Following the trend of the states in adopting compensation acts, 
the longshoreman was given a supposedly exclusive and absolute 
remedy-though limited in amount of recovery-against his steve-
dore-employer under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers 
Compensation Act. For a time it was thought that this statutory 
remedy precluded any other recovery by the injured longshore-
man. Then he was permitted by the courts to recover damages 
from the shipowner for injuries received by reason of the ship-
owner's negligence or the unseaworthiness of the vessel aboard 
which he was injured. A remedy on behalf of an injured worker 
against a third party is provided for in virtually all compensation 
acts and is specifically incorporated into the Longshoremen and 
Harbor Workers Compensation Act. However, because of the 
absolute and almost all-inclusive character of the unseaworthiness 
doctrine, the shipowner was virtually placed in an insurer's posi-
tion as to longshoremen. When this proved to be harsh and un-
just, the shipowner was permitted to recover over against the long-
shoreman's negligent stevedore-employer for breach of either an 
1963] LIABILITY OF STEVEDORES 563 
implied or an express warranty of workmanlike service. Though 
the underlying theory was somewhat fictitious, the necessity for 
allowing indemnification was occasioned by the existence of the 
ancient common-law rule against contribution between joint tort-
feasors. The only thing left to complete the circle of liability 
would be to grant the stevedore-employer a right of indemnifica-
tion against the injured longshoreman. Of course, such is not the 
law and is really unnecessary, because the injured longshoreman's 
recovery can be reduced in the first instance in accordance with 
the degree of his contributory negligence, if any is present. 
Although the route was circuitous, the result was reached. 
The stevedore now ultimately bears the risk in case of injury to 
his longshoreman-employee unless the injury is caused solely by 
the shipowner's negligence or an unseaworthy condition of the 
vessel to which the stevedore cannot be connected in any way. 
Certainly, both the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Com-
pensation Act itself and the reasons behind it have been nullified 
to a great extent. While the injured longshoreman still has the 
benefit of the rapid and assured recovery of statutorily-afforded 
compensation during disability, his stevedore-employer no longer 
has a limitation on his liability to offset its absolute character 
under the act. The basis for the act has been undermined to 
such an extent that its necessity and effectiveness are now ques-
tionable. This is the only major area within the compensation 
insurance field where such a result has occurred, although minor 
inroads appear to have been made in some jurisdictions even as 
to workmen's compensation.115 Careful scrutiny reveals that there 
are two basic reasons for this unique development: first, the abso-
lute quality of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness which 
was extended to longshoremen, thereby placing the shipowner in 
the position of an insurer, contrary to the best interests of the 
shipping industry in this country, which is already in the throes 
of economic and operational difficulties and is unable to assume 
additional financial burdens; and second, the venerable common-
law rule against contribution between joint tortfeasors. Many 
states have done away with the latter by statute, and in the ad-
miralty and maritime law field the judicially-devised rule of di-
vided damages has been applicable to collision cases for many 
115 See Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 849, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954); Annot., 43 
A.L.R.2d 865 (1954), and cases cited therein. See also Bowman v. Atlanta Baggage & 
Cab Co., 173 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Fla. 1959). 
564 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
years. The presence and applicability of both the unseaworthiness 
and joint tortfeasor doctrines has resulted in injustice to first the 
shipowner and then the stevedore by virtue of the placement of 
full liability on the one or the other, regardless of their respective 
degrees of fault. Since the substantive maritime law is composed 
largely of federal legislative enactments and judicial pronounce-
ments made over the years by the federal courts, it is to be ex-
pected that in the not too distant future liability may well be 
reapportioned between the injured longshoreman, the shipowner 
and the stevedore on some sort of a comparative responsibility 
basis, either by federal legislation or by further judicial interpre-
tation of the applicable substantive law.116 
116 The initial trend is seemingly to avoid application of the warranty of workman-
like service in difficult cases by holding that whatever caused the injury to the long-
shoreman did not cause the vessel to be unseaworthy. The effect of this is to free 
the innocent shipowner and limit the injured longshoreman's recovery and the stevedore-
employer's liability to that prescribed by the Longshoremen and Harbor ·workers Com-
pensation Act. Such was the result in all of the cases cited in note 57 supra. 'While 
this would appear to set the law back sixteen or more years, the result in particular 
cases is probably the least unsatisfactory. The ultimate solution will still probably be 
realistic apportionment between the three principals involved. 
